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""THAT THEY MAY THRIVE" GOAL OF CHILD
CUSTODY: REFLECTIONS ON THE APPARENT
EROSION OF THE TENDER YEARS
PRESUMPTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE
PRIMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION*
Sanford N. Katz**
And you who have heard the story of the chalk circle
Bear in mind the wisdom of our fathers:
Things should belong to those who do well by them
Children to motherly women that they may thrive
Wagons to good drivers that they may be well driven
And the valley to those who water it, that it may bear fruit.'
In the climax to Bertolt Brecht's play, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, the
judge listens to the arguments of two women who each want custody of the
same child. One claimant is the governor's wife, the biological mother of the
child; the other is Grusha, a maid. Over a year before, the governor's wife
abandoned her son in an effort to save herself. Grusha rescued the child and
cared for him tenderly. Now, the governor's wife returns and reclaims the
child. Judge Azdak sets up a test to determine who should be awarded
custody.
AZDAK to Plaintiff and defendant: the court has heard your case,
but has not yet ascertained who this child's real mother is. It is my
duty as judge to pick a mother for the child. I'm going to give you
a test. Shauva, take a piece of chalk. Draw a circle on the floor.
(Shauva draws a chalk circle on the floor) Put the child in the cir-
cle! (Shauva places Michael, who is smiling at Grusha, in the circle)
Plaintiff and defendant, stand just outside the circle, both of youl
(The governor's wife and Grusha step close to the circle) Each of
* This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered on March 22, 1990 at the Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America, as part of the Brendan Brown Lecture
Series. The lecture series honors Dr. Brendan Brown, the sixth dean of the Columbus School
of Law (1942-54).
** Boston University, A.B.; University of Chicago, J.D.; Professor of Law, Boston Col-
lege Law School.
1. 7 Bertolt Brecht, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, in COLLECTED PLAYS 229 (Ralph
Manheim & John Willett eds., 1974).
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you take the child by one hand. The true mother will have the
strength to pull the child out of the circle.
THE SECOND LAWYER (quickly) High court of justice, I object
to making the fate of the large Abashvili estates, which are entailed
to the child as heir, hinge on the outcome of so dubious a contest.
Furthermore, my client is not as strong as this person who is ac-
customed to physical labor.
AZDAK She looks well fed to me. Pulll
(The governor's wife pulls the child out of the circle. Grusha has let
go, she stands aghast)
THE FIRST LAWYER (congratulates the governor's wife) What
did I say? The ties of blood.
AZDAK (to Grusha) What's the matter with you? You didn't
pull.
GRUSHA I didn't hold on to him. (She runs to Azdak) Your
worship, I take back what I said against you, I beg your forgive-
ness. If only I could keep him until he knows all his words. He
knows just a few.
AZDAK Don't try to influence the court! I bet you don't know
more than twenty yourself. All right, I'll repeat the test to make
sure.
(Again the two women take their places)
AZDAK Pull!
(Again Grusha lets the child go)
GRUSHA I raised him! Do you want me to tear him to pieces? I
can't.
AZDAK (stands up) The court has now ascertained who the true
mother is. (To Grusha) Take your child and clear out.2
Like the Biblical story of Solomon ordering a child to be cut in half in
order to satisfy both claimants, the implied standard the judge used to decide
which woman should be awarded custody is which woman loves the child so
much that she would rather lose custody than injure him. A claimant's love
for a child is certainly a critical factor in judicial decision-making about chil-
dren, but it may be too simplistic to serve as the sole criterion. The court
scene in The Caucasian Chalk Circle is dramatically effective; however, the
argument is on a poetic level and does not recognize the unpalatable com-
plexities of the human situation. Moreover, the scene's focus is entirely on
the emotions of the contestants, ignoring those of the child.
I.
In divorce litigation, when an infant's custody is in dispute, a knowledge
2. Id. at 226-27.
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of property and proprietary rights in English history must precede any un-
derstanding of the approach taken by judges and lawyers. For centuries, the
common law did not recognize the autonomy of married women. Professor
Lawrence Stone categorizes the inferior position of wives in the sixteenth
century as one of "subordination.", 3 He notes, "By marriage, the husband
and wife became one person in law-and that person was the husband. He
acquired absolute control of all his wife's personal property, which he could
sell at will."4 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the ideal wo-
man was described as "weak, submissive, charitable, virtuous and modest
.... Her function was housekeeping, and the breeding and rearing of chil-
dren. In her behaviour she was silent in church and in the home, and at all
times submissive to men. '
This male domination of women and the control over their property con-
tinued into the nineteenth century. All authority rested with the husband
and father.6 It should not be surprising, then, that when separation or the
limited divorce then available occurred,7 there would be no question that the
father had the absolute right to the custody and control of his children dur-
ing their lives, and, upon their deaths, to the children's property. In their
book, Children in English Society, Ivy Pinchbeck and Margaret Hewitt em-
phasize this absolute right:
Even in deeds of legal separation, if the father voluntarily gave up
his rights to his children, the courts held that such deeds were void
in so far as they deprived the father of his powers over his children,
or provided that the mother should have possession of them in ex-
clusion of him. Indeed, the rights of the father as against the
mother were so absolute that the courts did not in fact have the
power to grant a right of access to her children to a mother whose
husband had not granted it himself.'
So secure was the father-child relationship that even in cases of what today
we might label as child abuse or neglect, intervention into that relationship
was exceedingly rare, and termination of the father-child relationship even
rarer.
3. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at
195 (1977).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 198.
6. Id. at 667-69.
7. In 16th century England, only a limited divorce was available. It was not until 1857
that divorce, as we know it today, was available in England. For a history of the debate
surrounding the implementation of modem English divorce law, see LAWRENCE STONE,
ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 368-82 (1990).
8. 2 IvY PINCHBECK AND MARGARET HEWITr, CHILDREN IN ENGLISH SOCIETY 362-
63 (1973).
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It is against this background that the campaign in England for judicial
reform in child custody legislation, which was led by Mrs. Caroline Norton
and culminated in the passage of the Infants Custody Act of 1839, seems
particularly heroic.9 Mrs. Caroline Norton was a prominent London society
hostess, author, and journalist. She married Richard Norton when she was
nineteen; after having three children, she left her husband and took their
children with her. Without notifying his wife, Mr. Norton, who had accused
his wife of adultery (she was later acquitted of the charge), took the children
from her care and refused to allow her to have any relationship with them.
Deeply distressed by not being able to see or communicate with her children,
Mrs. Norton wrote pamphlets in England about the plight of women in her
situation. Two of the most notable were The Natural Claim of a Mother to
the Custody of her Child as Affected by the Common Law Rights of the Fa-
ther and Illustrated by Cases of Peculiar Hardship and Separation of the
Mother and Child by the Law of Custody of Infants Considered, both of
which appeared in 1837.10
Mrs. Norton found a champion in Serjeant Talfourd, who had introduced
a child custody bill in 1838 which had passed the House of Commons in
England, but had not passed the House of Lords. After another try the
following year, both Houses passed the Custody of Infants Act. That Act
read as follows:
Whereas it is expedient to amend the Law relating to the Custody
of Infants: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent
Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiri-
tual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament as-
sembled, and by the Authority of the same, That after the passing
of this Act it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor and the
Master of the Rolls in England, and for the Lord Chancellor and
the Master of the Rolls in Ireland, respectively, upon hearing the
Petition of the Mother of any Infant or Infants being in the sole
Custody or Control of the Father thereof or of any Person by his
Authority, or of any Guardian after the Death of the Father, if he
shall see fit, to make Order for the Access of the Petitioner to such
Infant or Infants, at such Times and subject to such Regulations as
he shall deem convenient and just; and if such Infant or Infants
shall be within the Age of Seven Years, to make Order that such
Infant or Infants shall be delivered to and remain in the Custody of
the Petitioner until attaining such Age, subject to such Regulations
as he shall deem convenient and just.
9. Id. at 371-76.
10. Id. at 373.
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IV. Provided always, and be it enacted, That no Order shall be
made by virtue of this Act whereby any Mother against whom
Adultery shall be established, by Judgment in an Action for Crimi-
nal Conversation at the Suit of her Husband, or by the Sentence of
an Ecclesiastical Court, shall have the Custody of any Infant or
Access to any Infant, any thing herein contained to the contrary
notwithstanding. 1
The Custody of Infants Act of 1839, passed by the British Parliament, is
quoted at length because it is often heralded as being a victory for mothers,
establishing the maternal preference rule, and giving rise to the tender years
presumption, which is defined as the welfare of a child of tender years is best
served by its being placed in the custody of its mother.'2 Pinchbeck and
Hewitt, however, do not read the law so broadly.
It could be said that the Act was not so much concerned with the
welfare of the child as with the punishment of the mother proved
"guilty" in separation or divorce proceedings .... But in 1839, the
Custody of Infants Act constituted an immense and startling inno-
vation: the absolute right of the father was now subject to the dis-
cretionary power of the judge .... Under the Act the practice of
the courts was to decide if possible in favour of paternal right
rather than against it, and to exercise discretion against the mother
even as to young children. Nevertheless, despite its limitations,
this piece of legislation has a special importance since it was the
first statutory intervention in the common law rights of a father in
this country.13
Thirty-four years later, the Custody of Infants Act of 1873 was passed by
the British Parliament. That legislation extended the mother's rights to the
custody of her children to age sixteen, despite proven adultery.
II.
In the United States, some states incorporated the tender years presump-
tion into their child custody law by statute and by case law. " The presump-
tion is rebuttable by proof of the mother's unfitness. In many instances,
11. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch.
54 (Eng).
12. Rosemary L. Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 335
(1982).
13. PINCHBECK & HEWITT, supra note 8, at 376.
14. For a collection of cases, see Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Status of
Maternal Preferences Rule or Presumption in Child Custody Cases, 70 A.L.R.3D 262, 287-89
(1976). See also JOYCE H. GREEN ET AL., DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 24 & n.70 (1986);
Klaff, supra note 12, at 335 & n.3; Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Cus-
tody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 429-38 (1976-77).
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proving unfitness turned into ugly battles between spouses. At first glance,
the tender years presumption might appear to have been a method of pro-
tecting women's rights, but Professor Frances Olsen, suggesting that it was a
societal statement about the role of women in the family, writes that the
tender years "doctrine reinforced the ideology of inequality, which stated
that a woman's place is in the home. The doctrine therefore helped to keep
women in their place-that is, in the home serving others and not out in
public gaining power or making money."' 5 Although this may have been in
the minds or subconsciousness of some legislators and judges, such a motive
was not explicit. Courts justified their preference for awarding custody of
infants to mothers with lofty generalizations, referring to motherhood as be-
ing "God's own institution for the rearing and upbringing of the child"'16
and declaring that the tender years doctrine either "arises out of the very
nature and instincts of motherhood"' 7 or is an "inexorable natural force."'"
Coexisting with the tender years presumption in child custody laws was
the doctrine of "the best interests of the child." If a case involved a child
under the age of five and the state statute mandated, or case law adopted, the
tender years presumption, the presumption would apply. In that case, there
would be no need to use the best interests of the child doctrine. If the child
was over the age of five, the child's best interests would apply without regard
to the gender of the spouse; here, the mother might still be preferred, albeit
under the guise of the best interests of the child doctrine.
The best interests of the child doctrine has been criticized as being vague.
Because of its lack of a precise and uniform definition, it is argued that
judges have an opportunity to use their own cultural values and rules of
thumb to define and apply the standard. 9 Such an attack on the doctrine is
summarized by Judge Gary Crippen, stating that the best interests standard
"risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits manipulation and abuse,
and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to reconcile with an
15. Frances E. Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 15 (1984).
16. Hines v. Hines, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (Iowa 1921).
17. Krieger v. Krieger, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Idaho 1938).
18. Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 137 A.2d 618, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div 1958).
19. Elsewhere, Professor Walter 0. Weyrauch and I have written:
While it is true that the best-interests standard is indeterminate and speculative, ac-
tual adjudication poses fewer problems than is commonly assumed. In fact, the stan-
dard is not applied to bring about a result, but merely serves as a convenient and
useful justification for a decision reached on another level. Decision makers often
feel uncomfortable with sweeping discretionary powers unless they have worked out
more specific guidelines for exercising this seemingly unlimited discretion.
WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH & SANFORD N. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION
506 (1983).
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historic commitment to the rule of law." 20
III.
For the past thirty years, there has been a movement by state legislatures
to enact detailed child custody statutes that effectively limit judicial discre-
tion when interpreting and applying the best interests of the child doctrine. 21
These statutes, promulgated through the political legislative process, set
forth standards that must be enforced by judges. The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, a model proposal for many state statutes, enumerates factors
for a judge to consider in a child custody dispute which focus mainly on the
child, his wishes, and his relationships with others.22 In contrast to this
straightforward approach, some state statutes include elaborate schemes re-
quiring lawyers to prepare detailed parenting plans. 23 To lawyers, the effect
of such statutes has been to require thought, planning, and organization of
evidence in the preparation of a child custody case. Consequently, child cus-
tody trials have become more orderly. Judges are required to review the
parenting plans, make findings of fact, and write a well-reasoned decision
relating the evidence to the statutory standards. These requirements have
the positive result of minimizing or placing on record the expressions of bias.
As such, the likelihood of a trial judge's decision being reversed on appeal
for abuse of discretion or being unsupported by the facts is considerably
diminished.24
20. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Cus-
tody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499-500 (1990).
21. For a discussion of judicial discretion in family law decision-making, see Crippen,
supra note 20, at 430-31.
22. Section 402 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT reads:
Section 402. [Best Interest of Child.] The court shall determine custody in accord-
ance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
23. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (West Supp. 1991).
24. In Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985), Judge Wahl wrote:
The inherent imprecision heretofore present in our custody law has, in turn, dimin-
ished meaningful appellate review. We have repeatedly stressed the need for effective
19921
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Because of this case law and other relevant state statutes concerning child
custody, lawyers negotiate settlements in custody cases. Most custody dis-
putes are settled before they reach court and those that do reach court may
be settled after a pretrial conference with the judge. Chief Justice Neely of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has provided additional rea-
sons for such child custody settlements, based on the number of uncontested
divorces:
Over 90 percent of divorces are uncontested. This means that the
granting of the divorce is pro forma and routine, with all of the
important decisions made out of court-usually in law office nego-
tiations. In the case of middle or upper income clients, failure to
contest usually means a settlement has been reached.25
Others argue that most settlements result in the mothers receiving cus-
tody.26 The reasons for this result are complicated. Perhaps such settle-
ments are reached because lawyers, predicting what might occur at trial,
urge the father-clients to agree to the mother having custody. A mother
gaining custody in a settlement might mean that she bargained away per-
sonal advantages or gave up certain economic rights. Chief Justice Neely
writes:
These compromises [divorce settlements] are . . . approved by a
judge, who generally gives them only the most perfunctory sort of
review. The result is that parties (usually husbands) are free to use
whatever leverage is available to obtain a favorable settlement. In
practice this tends to mean that husbands will threaten custody
fights, with all of the accompanying traumas and uncertainties dis-
cussed above, as a means of intimidating wives into accepting less
child support and alimony than is sufficient to allow the mother to
appellate review of family court decisions in our cases, and have required specificity
in writing findings based on the statutory factors .... We are no less concerned that
the legal conclusion reached on the basis of those findings be subject to effective
review. We recognize the inherent difficulty of principled decision making in this
area of the law. Legal rules governing custody awards have generally incorporated
evaluations of parental fitness replete with ad hoc judgments on the beliefs, lifestyles,
and perceived credibility of the proposed custodian .... It is in these circumstances
that the need for effective appellate review is most necessary to ensure fairness to the
parties and to maintain the legitimacy of judicial decision making.
Id. at 713 (citations omitted).
25. Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics
of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 173 n. 11(1984) (citation omitted).
26. For a discussion of negotiations in divorce, motivations for spouses in seeking or not
seeking custody, and reasons for mothers remaining "the primary custodians of children fol-
lowing divorce," see generally Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What
Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
37-74 (Steven D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
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live and raise the children appropriately as a single parent. Be-
cause women are usually unwilling to accept even a minor risk of
losing custody, such techniques are generally successful.27
There is also the possibility that a father believes having custody might limit
his postdivorce life.
Through the years, a great deal of litigation has focused on whether a
mother's or father's right of custody is greater. This has led ineluctably to
the politicizing of the whole area of child custody.2" Initially, arguments
used to rebut the tender years presumption were based on the unfitness of
the mother and the fitness of the father and the parties used psychological
data, testimony of experts, and reports of everyday activities as evidence of
such. However, the battle over parental rights has been part of the revolu-
tion in individual rights that has been occurring over the past thirty years in
the United States. 29 With the rights revolution came new arguments made
on an unemotional and legalistic level, focusing particularly on constitu-
tional law and the language of constitutional litigation. Arguments were
now based on the theory that applying the tender years presumption against
a fit father was a violation of his right to equal protection of the law. In
some states such arguments proved successful under certain circumstances.
For example, the tender years presumption has been found by some state
supreme courts to violate the state's Equal Rights Amendment. a° Some
state supreme courts have found the presumption to violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.3 1 However, no case has yet been decided on this issue by the United
States Supreme Court.
By the 1970s, the tender years presumption had apparently lost its over-
riding importance in child custody cases. The rights arguments had affected
child custody legislation and court decisions. State statutes and judicial de-
cisions were declaring that parents as custodians should be treated equally in
these disputes. This was the period when Beyond the Best Interests of the
27. Neely, supra note 25, at 177.
28. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 786-849 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing the legal theories of child custody and offering a
wealth of information about the psychiatric and social science research on child custody that
has been completed during the last decade and a half).
29. See generally, Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) (examining the evolving constitutional limits on family law, par-
ticularly emphasizing privacy rights into which the state should not intrude).
30. See, e.g., Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Construction and Application of State Equal
Rights Amendments Forbidding Determination of Rights Based on Sex, 90 A.L.R.3D 158
(1979). For a discussion of legislative action in this area, see GREEN ET AL., supra note 14, at
253-54.
31. See CLARK, supra note 28, at 800 & n.22.
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Child was published. 32 This work, based on psychoanalytic theory, had con-
siderable influence not only on making that theory and certain psychological
terminology a part of child custody laws, but also in changing the major
focus in child custody disputes from the claimants to the child. The authors
declared that when a divorce is contemplated, parents should make a sincere
effort to solve the problems of child custody themselves, thereby placing a
high premium on family privacy and autonomy. But when there are insolu-
ble conflicts which the couple can not solve privately or through mediation,
the couple must go to court. In such cases, the authors state that a judge
ought to approach child custody disputes from the vantage of the needs of
the child based on the child's particular age, attachments, and stage of devel-
opment. Additionally, the judge should consider the adult who can satisfy
those needs best.
Furthermore, the authors define the child as a unique person, rather than
a miniature adult, who is dependent on the adult world and needs to be
wanted, loved, nurtured, and protected. A child also needs stimulation and
continuity of care in order to have a chance to develop into a healthy adult.
The authors point out that a child's sense of time is different from that of an
adult, and therefore, separations should be minimized while stability with an
adult figure maximized. They emphasize that during much of a child's life,
he is dependent on adults, not only for protection but also for physical and
emotional developments, all of which are intimately connected.
It follows, then, that adults who can fulfill children's needs are not neces-
sarily defined by gender or by biology. The authors introduce the concept of
the psychological parent-a person who fulfills the child's needs as well as
wants the child and values her as a person. The specific ideas synthesized in
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child as summarized here are accepted today
in one form or another by child development and mental health experts.
The book and some of the concepts it has introduced into the law have been
cited in some appellate court cases.33
IV.
The 1980s saw the emergence of the concept of the primary caretaker
preference in child custody disputes-a concept which now seems to have
32. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
33. See, e.g., David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 916-17 & n.10 (W. Va. 1989);
Fatemi v. Fatemi, 537 A.2d 840, 848 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486,
490-91 & n.6 (Cal. 1986); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 1985); Yontef v.
Yontef, 440 A.2d 899, 904 (Conn. 1981); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 n.2 (Mass.
1981); Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Conn. 1980).
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captured the interest of family law scholars, judges, and law reformers.34
The primary caretaker is defined as the person who, before the divorce, man-
aged, monitored the day-to-day activities of the child, and met the child's
basic needs including: feeding, clothing, bathing, and protecting the child's
health. It is assumed that the primary caretaker will continue in that role
after the divorce. The standard used in a custodial disposition, singles out
continuity of care-a standard proposed by the authors of Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child-to trump all others.3 5
Chief Justice Neely, a strong and forceful advocate of the primary care-
taker rule, writes that such a rule spells "mother."' 36 After reviewing the
research in the field and using his own experience as a lawyer and judge, he
concludes that mothers are "more likely than fathers to feel close to their
children."' 37 His major arguments supporting the primary caretaker pre-
sumption, however, are rooted in his mistrust of divorce negotiation, the
divorce process itself, and the use of experts. He believes that if the pre-
sumption is established, the likelihood of using child custody litigation as a
bargaining chip in negotiation is diminished. According to Chief Justice
Neely, the presumption minimizes elaborate and time-consuming custody
trials in which a costly battle of experts dominates the litigation and women
are disadvantaged because they cannot finance such lengthy and complex
litigation. He also believes that determining who is the primary caretaker is
34. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 559 (1984); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the
Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1987); Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 773-74 (1988). See generally Crippen, supra note 20 (analyzing Pikula
and the tension in child custody law between a need for predictable results and the freedom to
consider variations in each family situation); Neely, supra note 25 (offering the primary care-
taker parent rule as a solution to the current child-custody rules which work against the inter-
ests of the parents); Bruce Ziff, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Canadian Perspectives on
an American Development, 4 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 186 (1990) (expressing doubts about the
effectiveness of the primary caretaker rule).
35. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 31-34; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 66-67 (1986).
36. Neely, supra note 25, at 180.
37. Id. at 171. Professor Olsen has written:
Women argue that women's role as bearers of children gives them a greater interest
than men in the welfare of children. Perhaps or perhaps not. The cultural meaning
of pregnancy and childbirth, not the simple biological fact, is the crucial issue. In
any event, women's role as primary caretakers alone is certainly sufficient to explain
the greater stake women seem to have in children.
Frances E. Olsen, Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches with Special Reference to the
United States Convention on the Rights of the Child 51 n.3 (Oct. 1991) (unpublished manu-
script on file with the author).
1992]
134 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:123
a simpler task than delving into the elaborate factors used to determine who
was, and will be, a good parent. For him, the answer is basic: the mother.
Professor Bruce Ziff has challenged the primary caretaker presumption by
asking some critical questions. Why should the primary caretaker presump-
tion be considered the exclusive reliable means of choosing a custodian? In
other words, is past conduct-maintaining and monitoring day-to-day activ-
ities of the child-the only true test for choosing who should be the child's
custodian? Is there a rational connection between this presumption and the
nurturing activities of the custodian? Does the presumption emphasize
quantity of care at the expense of its quality? Does "primary caretaker"
define the strongest bond between parent and child? Will the presumption
really deter litigation and promote more fair negotiations between parents?
If the presumption is established and known, will it promote coparenting-a
desirable social goal? Since more parents are now both working outside the
home and utilizing various forms of day care, does this pose difficulties in
identifying the primary caretaker? Moreover, with the current economic sit-
uation-particularly the rise in unemployment-causing changes in parental
roles, will the primary caretaker necessarily be the mother?38 In order to
best answer any of Professor Ziff's important questions, the judge must
make an inquiry into the particular facts of the case and examine the quality
of the parent-child relationship.
The emergence of the primary caretaker presumption, focusing custody
disputes on custodians rather than on the child, fuels political fires by declar-
ing, even before a case is heard, that one parent has the advantage. If that
parent is the mother, Professors Clark and Glowinsky ask whether the pri-
mary caretaker presumption is "a thinly disguised form of the tender years
doctrine."' 39 If this is the case, will we see a return to the ugly disputes
38. These questions are thoroughly critiqued in Ziff, supra note 34. For a full exploration
of the arguments for and against the primary caretaker preference, including case law and
statutes, see Crippen, supra note 20.
39. HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS 1075 (4th ed. 1990). Justice Wahl answered this question in the negative.
Writing in Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 712 n.2 (Minn. 1985), he said:
The primary parent preference, while in accord with the tender years doctrine insofar
as the two rules recognize the importance of the bond formed between a primary
parent and a child, differs from the tender years doctrine in significant respects.
Most importantly, the primary parent rule is gender neutral. Either parent may be
the primary parent; the rule does not incorporate notions of biological gender deter-
minism or sex stereotyping. In addition, the rule we fashion today we believe will
encourage co-parenting in a marriage unlike the tender years doctrine which, for
fathers, meant that whatever function they assumed in the rearing of their children
would be deemed irrelevant in a custody contest.
That They May Thrive
concerned with the unfitness of the primary caretaker? Will there be a resur-
gence of the old arguments for gender neutrality?
It seems obvious that no simple phrase can describe the person who best
fulfills the needs of an infant, nor should any single characteristic be so over-
whelmingly important that it supersedes all others without any serious in-
quiry. Each child is a unique person who responds to different individuals
and environments in her own way. For example, siblings may be totally
different from each other although they may have been raised by the same
parents in the same household.
Custody decisions about infants should focus first on the individual child
and take into account such factors as the child's age, physical and emotional
development, place in the family, attachments, special relationships, and in-
dividual needs. Next, an inquiry should be made into the circumstances sur-
rounding the separation of the spouses and the characteristics of the
custodian or custodians who can best fulfill the child's needs. The complexi-
ties inherent in human relationships make generalizations about them ex-
tremely difficult. Nevertheless, laws must be made to guide decision-makers
who are confronted with a child custody dispute which the spouses them-
selves cannot resolve. Such laws should not be drafted simply to respond to
generalizations but rather should leave room for flexibility as well as respect
for the individuality of both the child and the person or persons who desire
to care for that child.
There is no question that using a presumption in child custody disputes
makes the judge's job easier, but too many human factors are ignored in
such a process. The Caucasian Chalk Circle test was simple-too simple,
actually-to use as a guideline for the "brute facts" of custody decisions.
Law reformers are constantly seeking magical solutions or formulas for
determining who should be awarded custody in divorce cases. While mathe-
matical formulas might work in determining child support payments, there
are no such mechanical tests for child placement. The focus in child custody
today should not be placed on searching for such tests, but rather on human-
izing the process by which custody disputes are resolved. This requires the
judge to approach each case with an open mind, apply the appropriate stan-
dards, and support the decision with specific reasons.
The process in divorce must be fair and the claimants must perceive it as
such, otherwise parents may feel that either they are not receiving equal
treatment or their individual voices are not being heard. When parents feel
that they are treated indifferently, and the judge has failed to consider what
parenthood has meant to them in the past, they may resist the decision. As a
result, however, the child suffers. The treatment of children after divorce is
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the ultimate test. No matter who is assigned custody-mother, father, or
another adult-children need support, particularly psychological support.
In the end, decisions about custody must be intimately connected with sup-
port and the ultimate goal of child custody must always be "that they may
thrive."
